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Abstract 
Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) has had predictable effects. How exit plays out is 
scenario-dependent. Quantitative easing has had the predictable effect of encouraging currency 
depreciation and some partner countries may have attempted to offset these exchange rate 
effects.  Korea presents a particularly interesting case: it is relatively small and relatively open 
and integrated, in both trade and financial terms, with the United States and Japan, two 
practitioners of UMP. Authorities have acted to limit the won’s appreciation primarily against 
the currency of China, not the US or Japan. Nevertheless, Korea’s policy is a source of tension 
with the US. Under legislation currently being considered, the currency manipulation issue could 
potentially interfere with Korean efforts to attract direct investment from the US and create an 
obstacle to Korea joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
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Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the US Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) and several 
other central banks (including the Bank of Japan) adopted unorthodox and controversial 
monetary policies including quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance known together as 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP).  Considerable effort has been expended to try to 
understand the effectiveness of UMP, its spillovers onto other economies, and how the Fed and 
other central banks might unwind the policy and return to conventional monetary policy. The 
latter concern is particularly acute as the Fed’s return to exit from QE and return to positive 
policy rates (“liftoff”) appears imminent. 
   In this context, Korea presents a particularly interesting case: it is relatively small and 
relatively open and integrated in both trade and financial terms with the United States and Japan. 
Hence it would be a prime candidate for spillovers from UMP as practiced in the two larger 
economies as well as any fall-out that might accompany the Fed’s return to conventional 
monetary policy and the less imminent exit from QE by the Bank of Japan. 
The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that UMP has had fairly predictable effects 
on partner countries. How exit plays out is scenario-dependent and less certain, but if it occurs 
against a backdrop of robust growth in the US it should be benign, though not necessarily 
entirely so.  QE has had the predictable effect of encouraging currency depreciation and some 
partner countries may have attempted to offset these exchange rate effects.  In the case of Korea, 
it appears that the authorities have acted to limit the won’s appreciation against the Chinese 
RMB (not the US dollar or the Japanese yen). Nevertheless the country’s intervention policy has 
become a source of growing tension with the US, and was raised in the October 2015 meeting 
between Presidents Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye. If not addressed, under legislation 
currently before the Congress and likely to be enacted into US law, the currency manipulation 
issue could potentially interfere with Korean attempts to attract direct investment from the 
United States and create an obstacle to Korea joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). More 
serious consultation between the two governments on the transparency and nature of Korean 
monetary policy and fiscal space and a realistic appraisal of North Korean how contingencies 
impinge on South Korean fiscal policy would be the place to start.  
  
 
3 
 
 
How We Got Here 
 
The origins of the GFC reside in a witches brew of complex instruments, inadequate regulation, 
lax enforcement, and unethical, and in some cases outright criminal, behavior in major financial 
institutions.
1
 At the core was the “originate and distribute banking model.” This approach 
involved securitization, the bundling and reselling of debt instruments, in many cases housing 
mortgages, which reduced the incentive of originators to exercise due diligence with respect to 
borrowers, since the originating institutions were not holding the underlying debts on their 
books. Loan quality predictably declined.  
Although the initial warning signs appeared in Europe, the US was the epicenter of the 
crisis.
2
  In March 2008 the government assisted in the takeover of the securities firm Bear 
Stearns by JP Morgan. After a period of relative calm, the crisis got into full swing in September 
2008 with in quick succession, the entry into conservatorship the government-sponsored 
enterprises, housing agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the failure of Lehman Brothers 
securities firm, the government-encouraged purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, and 
the rescue of insurer AIG. Additional bank reorganizations and bail-outs followed (Johnson and 
Kwak 2011).  
The propagation of highly complex financial instruments, many related to the 
securitization of mortgage lending, was abetted by unusually low interest rates due to a variety of 
factors including the Asian savings glut and a bias toward monetary ease by the US Federal 
Reserve under the leadership of Governor Alan Greenspan. Low interest rates both facilitated 
borrowing in the first instance or primary sense, as well as encouraging excessive leverage 
among secondary market participants (Taylor 2009). 
                                                 
1
 This section draws on Noland (2009), Gagnon and Hinterschweiger (2013), and 
Stockton (2015).  
2
 In July 2007, IKB, a mid-sized German bank came under pressure due to heavy 
exposure to US subprime assets and was recapitalized by its state-owned largest shareholder. The 
following year the British bank Northern Rock was nationalized and there were problems at the 
French bank BNL Paribas in both cases also connected to problems with mortgage-backed 
securities. 
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To make matters worse, the ratings agencies and regulators were asleep at the switch. In 
particular, the regulatory system of the US was revealed to be fragmented and inadequate, 
particularly with respect to the so-called “shadow banking system” comprised of non-bank 
financial institutions such as hedge funds.  Abundant liquidity and regulatory lassitude enabled 
criminal frauds on a grand scale (e.g. the Madoff and Stanford scandals) as well as more garden 
variety scamming (e.g. Goldman Sachs’ Fabrice “Fabulous Fab” Tourre). Similar developments 
occurred in parallel elsewhere around the globe, particularly in the UK. 
The crisis was propagated internationally through open capital markets exposing pre-
existing weaknesses in financial sectors and participants outside the US. Examples would 
include the lack of capital adequacy of some European banks and real estate bubbles in Europe, 
as well as reliance on short-term foreign borrowing and potential term mismatches in Korean 
banks. And once the crisis got underway, rising interest rates exposed weaknesses in other 
segments of the US financial market, such as consumer lending and commercial real estate in the 
US. 
One can imagine crisis response taking three forms: fiscal, monetary, and regulatory 
policy.
3
 Initially, the fiscal response in the US was forceful (at least as measured by 
expenditures), but inconsistent and ad hoc, complicated by the electoral calendar in the US and 
the political transition from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration, and 
subsequently by a fundamental lack of consensus in a badly divided US Congress. The US 
adopted two fiscal stimulus packages at the federal level but prematurely reversed field in 2011, 
after the Republican Party took control of the House of Representatives in the November 2010 
Congressional elections. This shift ushered in a period of heightened uncertainty and repeated 
“cliffhangers” as the Congress (primarily the Republican leadership of the House) and the 
Obama Administration repeatedly played chicken, culminating in a 16 day partial shutdown of 
the Federal government in 2013.  Stockton (2015 page 47) observes that according to the 
Macroeconomic Advisers index, “the average level of fiscal policy uncertainty between the 
beginning of 2011 and the end of 2013 was more than 50 percent higher than the average over 
the 1986 to 2010 period.” 
                                                 
3
 The regulatory response in the US, which is beyond the scope of this paper, took the 
form of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
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The inconstant and unpredictable fiscal policy forced a heavier than necessary reliance on 
monetary policy. In October 2008, the Fed, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, 
and the Swiss National Bank began coordinated interest rate cuts. Soon the Fed faced the 
problem that it is impossible to push short-term policy rates below zero, “the lower bound.” In 
November 2008, the Fed initiated a policy of quantitative easing through large-scale purchases of 
long-term assets and forward guidance to try to influence market participants’ expectations as to 
the future path of interest rates (together termed unconventional monetary policy or UMP). This 
policy can be seen in figure 1, in both the ballooning of the Fed balance sheet as well as the 
compositional shift toward long-term assets.
4
 The Bank of England followed suit, initiating QE 
in January 2009.  The European Central Bank started a limited QE program in May 2009.   
The first round of US QE was expanded in March 2009 and continued through March 
2010. A second round of QE was launched in November 2010 and lasted until June 2011. Third 
round of QE was implemented between September 2012 and October 2014.
5
 The preponderance 
of evidence concludes that unconventional monetary policy was indeed effective in lowering the 
yield curve. Stockton (2015 page 40) concludes, “Taken together, the monetary policy actions 
initiated between 2007 and 2014 arguably constitute the most aggressive and creative set of 
policy responses by the central bank in its 100-year history.” 
Unfortunately, it was not enough. The US experienced its sharpest contraction since the 
Great Depression, with real GDP falling a cumulative 4.2 percent from its peak in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 to the trough in the second quarter of 2009. Unemployment, which had been 
around 6 percent in September 2008, rose to 10 percent in October 2009. The intervening period 
has seen a startling rise in disability applications and fall in labor force participation which may 
signal an unrecoverable reduction in economic potential and permanent damage to household 
welfare. Research suggests that fiscal policy tends to have more direct external spillovers. The 
                                                 
4
 In September 2011 the Fed also launched Operation Twist in which it shifted the 
composition of the portfolio away from short-term securities and toward long-term securities in 
the expectation that this shift in relative demand would further flatten the yield curve by driving 
down long-term interest rates” (Stockton 2015 page 39). 
5
 See Fawley and Neely (2013), Gagnon and Hinterschweiger (2013), and Stockton 
(2015) for additional detail.   
  
 
6 
 
uneven implementation of fiscal policy not only was disadvantageous domestically, but arguably 
hurt foreign countries as well.  
The subsequent tepid recovery, reminiscent of Japan’s lost decades, was consistent with 
the historical pattern of slow recoveries in other post financial crisis episodes (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009).  Perhaps owing to schadenfreude, during the early stages of the GFC there was 
wishful thinking about “decoupling,” the idea that Asia would be able to maintain its growth 
rates, even as the US and Europe slowed.  Instead, Asia was impacted through both the real and 
financial channels, as a combination of slowdown in the US and Europe and depreciation of the 
US dollar led to a substantial, sustained increase in US net exports.
6
   
And while the Fed was the most aggressive in implementing QE, it did not invent the 
policy.  Faced with years of deflation and anemic growth, Japan had attempted a kind of 
precursor policy to QE beginning in March 2001 when it switched its main operating target from 
the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the quantity of bank reserves, before reverting to the 
previous policy in March 2006 (Fawley and Neely 2013). A QE policy was initiated in a limited 
fashion in 2008, then more fully in 2010, and implemented more aggressively starting in in April 
2013, following the appointment of Haruhiko Kuroda as governor of the Bank of Japan the 
previous month (Figure 2). QE contributed to a depreciation of the yen, an increase in corporate 
profitability and stock prices, but not so much to export volumes (figure 3).  
Not all central banks adopted QE.  As shown in figure 4, while the balance sheets of 
some central banks (most notably the Fed, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan) have 
ballooned with purchases of long-term securities, the ECB’s implementation of QE has been less 
resolute. The People’s Bank of China, the Chinese central bank, and the Bank of Korea have 
continued to implement conventional monetary policies. Their balance sheets have grown fairly 
steadily during this period, with the Bank of Korea balance sheet showing the smallest growth by 
far of the six central banks depicted in figure 4. 
 
Spillovers 
                                                 
6
 One upside for most of Asia associated with the weakening of global growth was the 
fall in commodity prices, particularly of oil, and the improvement in the terms of trade acted as a 
kind of automatic stabilizer, cushioning the external shock. 
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Given the unprecedented nature of the policies understandable concern has centered on how 
unconventional monetary policies might affect other countries. Several channels are frequently 
cited.  First, as noted in the previous section, the maintenance of domestic demand in countries 
aggressively implementing UMP sustains their demand for imports, directly affecting partner 
countries through the trade channel. Second, the maintenance of low interest rates for a sustained 
period would encourage risky behavior and potentially even financial market bubbles as 
investors engaged in an increasingly desperate “search for yield.”  Such arguments are 
sometimes made with respect to capital inflows into emerging markets, the so-called “wall of 
money.” A third channel which in some sense is a byproduct of the first two, is the impact on 
asset markets that may go beyond the standard links to parity conditions and trade flows. Finally, 
while QE is undertaken for domestic policy objectives, not to gain unfair advantage in 
international trade, the policy could have the effect of driving down the exchange rate and in 
some sense amount to a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. However, many macro models and 
empirical studies find that the domestic demand and exchange rate effects roughly offset each 
other, so that there are no net effects on trade balances.  This point is usually cited by advocates 
of UMP against beggar-thy-neighbor policy charge.   
Economists have long analyzed the cross-border spillover impact of monetary policy via 
exchange rates, bond yields, and stock prices, and associated capital flows.
7
  Much of this work 
involves highly complex statistical techniques applied to high frequency data, often taking the 
form of “event studies” where the researcher attempts to isolate and extract from the time-series 
the influence of various drivers on outcomes. 
Traditionally a tightening of monetary policy in a major country would be associated 
with an appreciation of its currency.  That exchange rate movement in turn would have several 
effects on other countries. Ceterus paribus, in terms of trade, the appreciation would make 
imports cheaper in the tightening country, boosting foreign income by increasing foreign exports. 
                                                 
7
 While this discussion focuses on monetary transmission channels, it should not be 
forgotten that fiscal policy confers spillovers as well, and these may be relatively larger. The 
overreliance on monetary policy as a byproduct of the dysfunctional political economy of fiscal 
policy in several of the large countries implicitly meant that positive spillovers were less than 
they might otherwise have been. 
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However, from the standpoint of the foreign country, the currency depreciation would raise the 
cost of imports, and might induce the foreign central bank to tighten to stave off inflation.  
One would normally expect that a tightening in one country would encourage capital 
inflows into that country and out of the others (indeed this is how the exchange rate movement 
would be effectuated.) One would expect this to manifest in movements in local stock and bond 
prices which in turn affect the ability of local firms to invest.  
Availability of liquidity and willingness for banks to lend internationally may constitute 
yet another channel, including through international bank lending and portfolio flows through 
use of the US dollar (or other major currencies whose central banks might tighten) as funding 
and investing currencies. 
If the banks or firms in the non-tightening country hold debts in the currency of the 
tightening country, then a balance sheet effect would come into play, in which the domestic 
resource cost of servicing the foreign debt would increase. 
Last but not least, evidence suggests that UMP has sustained domestic demand beyond 
what would have been the case if central banks had just lowered the short-term funds rate to zero 
and done nothing more (Chung et al. 2011). Much weaker advanced economy output, and 
potentially much lower inflation, may well have had negative consequences for countries like 
Korea that could easily have swamped the currency spillovers.   
In some sense what matters is the net effect of these various forces. Does enhanced 
competitiveness and rising foreign demand outweigh capital outflow, possibly declining local 
financial asset prices, and a negative balance sheet effect generating an overall positive impact? 
Or do the negative factors predominate?       
How these effects play out is not scenario-independent: if the tightening was undertaken 
in response to robust growth then it will tend to reinforce the relative price and demand effects 
through the trade channel; if it were taken in response to some kind of inflation shock or 
financial market distress, those income effects could be attenuated, and the capital flow and 
balance sheet effects could loom relatively larger. Indeed, in the era of UMP there is some 
thought that changes in risk premia have become larger and pure changes in perceived risk may 
exert a significant impact on observed outcomes. This concern has become particularly acute 
since the May 2013 “taper tantrum” when global financial markets experienced significant 
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volatility in response to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s announcement that the Fed would begin 
tapering its purchases of assets under the existing QE framework. 
By and large existing studies have found that on balance tightening in the US or Europe 
is normally associated with exchange rate depreciation, inflation and output contraction in other 
countries, while a loosening of monetary policy has the opposite effect (cf. Fukuda et al. 2013, 
Georgiadis 2015, and IMF 2015a).  These magnitude of these effects are correlated with various 
country characteristics including the degree of trade and financial openness, exchange rate 
flexibility, flexibility of labor markets, and other factors.  
However, there is some thought that such effects may be different in the era of UMP and 
considerable recent research has been devoted to examining this possibility. Although the 
frameworks and nomenclature differ somewhat from study to study, in general, because in the 
era of UMP central banks operate do not primarily by adjust policy rates, and emphasis has been 
put on forward guidance, these studies have devoted effort to what might be thought of as effects 
via a real or market channel in which monetary policy affects outcomes by reflecting changes in 
the underlying economy or via portfolio rebalancing and the Fed’s (and other central banks) 
communications about the long-term outlook for the economy (particularly important in light of 
extended forward guidance under UMP), and a signaling effect associated with information with 
respect to future short-term policy rates. 
Four recent studies (Chen et a. 2014, Gagnon 2015, Glick 2015, IMF 2015a) and that 
have examined these issues come to similar conclusions. The IMF spillover report (based in part 
on Chen et al.) examines the possible impact of real shocks, money shocks, and risk shocks. Real 
shocks in US lead to higher capital inflows and an increase in industrial production in emerging 
markets (like China) and non-systemic advanced countries (like Korea), while money shocks do 
the opposite. The Fund hypothesizes that the real shocks leads to capital inflows in the emerging 
markets and non-systemic advanced countries for two reasons: first, the shock in the US leads to 
appreciation (and then the usual trade effects) and second because the improvement in the US 
lowers the risk premium on investment. They believe the second factor is more important. Where 
the fund sees current risks globally is with respect to balance sheets, but do not cite either China 
or Korea as being problematic in this regard. The Korean case will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section. 
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Chen et al., Gagnon, and Glick attempt to tease out real or market effects versus 
announcement or signaling effects and compare responses under conventional monetary policy 
(CMP) and unconventional monetary policy (UMP) and some instances between the pre-taper 
period of QE and the situation after May 2013. The studies find no evidence of a diminution of 
these effects in the UMP period and there is some evidence that they have become more 
pronounced.  
Gagnon examines daily data on US bond yields, exchanges rates, foreign bond yields and 
stock prices from January 2006 through July 2015, distinguishing between effects on typical 
trading days and Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) days. Increases in US interest rates are 
general associated with increases in foreign interest rates, depreciation of foreign currencies, and 
increases in foreign stock prices.  The effects appear to be large, and greatest stock prices.  
In general, the interest rate effect is larger on normal trading days, which he interprets as 
reflecting economic fundamentals, and smaller on FOMC days which reflect a mix of real and 
announcement effects. There are exceptions, however, where the movement in interest rates is 
larger on FOMC days, which Gagnon interprets as possibly signaling a “risky” country. Korea is 
one: Gagnon estimates that a one percentage point rise in US interest rates generates a 0.29 
percentage point rise in Korean rates on normal days, and a 0.42 percentage point rise on FOMC 
days. Japan and China exhibit less responsiveness to changes in US interest rates. 
With respect to exchange rates, the Korean and Chinese currencies depreciate modestly 
in response to increases in US bond yields, while the Japanese yen (and the Swiss franc) exhibit 
perverse movement, appreciating in response to a US interest rate rise.  One possible explanation 
is that these are essentially safe have currencies: when interest rates rise in the US, investors pull 
their money out of weaker parts of Europe and Asia, and deposit funds in Switzerland and Japan, 
respectively. 
Foreign stock prices generally rise in response to increases in US bond yields, 
particularly on normal trading days which Gagnon interprets as reflecting improved 
fundamentals in the US. One exception is China where the stock market declines slightly when 
the yield increase occurs on an FOMC day.  Gagnon does not uncover statistically significant 
differences in the CMP and UMP periods. 
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Glick obtains similar results, though he finds that the exchange rate effects are more 
pronounced during the UMP period.  He also makes the point that “non-announcements” can 
have an impact: both the Korean won and Japanese yen appreciated in response to 17 September 
2015 “non-announcement” easing surprise when the Fed decided not to begin liftoff.8 
Chen et al.  employ the most elaborate techniques, distinguishing between CMP, and 
UMP before and after the taper announcement in May 2013.  They find in general that the 
spillover effects are larger in the UMP period and that the impact of signal surprises were bigger 
than the impact of real or market surprises.  They also uncover some evidence that the magnitude 
of these effects has increased in the post-taper period.  This suggests that we should be prepared 
for significant reactions when the Fed finally does exit QE and begins its liftoff. 
 
Liftoff 
 
While UMP appears to have addressed the critical issues facing the US and other crisis 
economies during the GFC, it carries risks and the consensus is that the Fed and other central 
banks should return to conventional policies as soon as warranted.  In his 2012 Jackson Hole 
speech Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke identified these as the impairment of certain securities 
markets as Fed purchases in effect crowded out private agents; growth of an overly large balance 
sheet could undermine public confidence that the Fed would be able to successfully exit QE; 
maintenance of low interest rates for a sustained period could induce excessive risk; and lastly 
that the Fed could incur financial losses is interest rates were to rise unexpectedly, adding to the 
fiscal burden (Bernanke 2012).
9
     
                                                 
8
 Although the focus of this analysis is the impact of UMP developments in China also 
have spillover effects. Glick points out that in response to the RMB depreciation of 11 August 
2015, the Korean won depreciated more than any other currency, while the Japanese yen 
appreciated more than any other currency. According to his statistical analysis, the won (and the 
Taiwanese dollar) depreciated more than would be explained purely on the basis of trade 
linkages. 
9
 It is worth re-emphasizing that these risks were magnified by political dysfunction in 
the US. As Stockton assesses, “a more predictable and less contractionary fiscal policy would 
have allowed the Federal Reserve to ease back more promptly from their unconventional 
policies, mitigating any potential adverse side effects” (Stockton 2015 page 48).  
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 The Fed is expected to begin raising interest rates at its final meeting of 2015 in 
December, or sometime during the Spring of 2016.  As Stockton observes “Long-term interest 
rates likely to rise in anticipation of Fed tightening much as they did when the Fed began to talk 
about the start of QE tapering in the spring of 2013…Policymakers and market participants 
should be prepared for bouts of heightened volatility as the process of policy normalization 
proceeds” (Stockton 2015 p.51). In terms of current conditions, the IMF Stability Report has 
observed a rotation of risks from developed countries such as those of the Eurozone to the 
emerging markets, where the key risks are liftoff (and expected balance sheet strains in some 
economies), weak commodity prices, and uncertainties involving China (IMF 2015b). Eventually 
the other central banks that have implemented UMP will also liftoff. From the standpoint of 
Northeast Asia, the Bank of Japan will be the most relevant in this regard, though Japanese exit 
from QE does not appear imminent.    
How this all plays out is scenario-dependent.  The most benign scenario would be one in 
which the liftoff is motivated by robust growth in the US.  While there might be some transitory 
financial market volatility in this scenario, the evidence reviewed in the previous section 
suggests that it would likely be accompanied by dollar appreciation and more demand for exports 
from Northeast Asia.   
One can mechanically apply the econometric estimates reviewed in the previous section 
to obtain an illustrative benchmark of the magnitudes of these effects.  For example, if interest 
rates were to rise three percentage points (a three percent real interest rate plus a two percent rate 
of inflation, the latter already reflected in current market expectations) the dollar might 
appreciate by something like five to ten percent—not a gigantic move, but one that would shift 
relative prices if sustained. Depending on the extent to which the yield curve flattened (which 
would convey information about the expectations of future growth prospects) the boost to 
foreign output could be on a similar order of magnitude to the rise in long-term rates. Foreign 
stocks would rally. 
But it’s important to remember that even this simple calculation is context dependent. If 
the US liftoff occurs in a context of weak or weakening growth in Europe, Japan, and/or China, 
then there would likely be pre-existing pressure on the dollar and the US trade balance. The 
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additional impetus for appreciation and expansion of the trade deficit would occur against this 
backdrop and could become a political issue as discussed below.  
There are even less benign alternatives, however: an unanticipated bout of inflation could 
prompt the Fed to raise rates, a development which compared to the robust growth scenario 
would be associated with weaker aggregate demand in the US, as will a greater degree of 
financial market volatility globally. Beneficial spillovers would be attenuated. 
Probably the worst scenario would be a liftoff motivated by financial stability concerns, 
where rising rates and slumping aggregate demand in an already low-inflation environment could 
push the US closer to deflationary trap similar to that observed in Japan for twenty years.   
From this perspective, Korea presents the most interesting case in Northeast Asia: it is 
relatively small, relatively open in both trade and financial terms, and integrated with both the 
US and Japan, and its recent economic history demonstrates that it is sensitive to these 
developments.   
Korea was badly hit by the 1997-98 financial crisis in significant part due to high levels 
of corporate leverage and enormous currency and term mismatches in its pattern of borrowing 
and lending (Noland 2000). While the post-crisis reform and reorganization of the financial 
sector represented a marked improvement, events during the GFC revealed the country’s 
continuing vulnerability to financial shocks emanating from abroad.  
In 2008, Korea had the largest negative net foreign currency asset to trade ratio of any 
country in Asia (Gagnon 2014).  External debt ramped up from $188 billion in 2005 to $426 
billion or 175 percent of GDP in third quarter of 2008 (Lee and Rhee 2012).  
The composition of capital inflows was heavily weighted toward bank loans which are 
more volatile than direct or portfolio investment flows (Jeanne 2014 Table 2). Short-term 
external debt (maturity of less than one year) grew even more rapidly than external debt overall, 
rising from $66 billion in 2005 to $190 billion during the third quarter of 2008, equivalent to 45 
percent of GDP, similar in magnitude to the level reached during the 1997-98 crisis. In the third 
quarter of 2008, the ration of short-term debt to reserves reached 79 percent (Lee and Rhee 
2012). Korean banks had dealt with potential currency mismatch issues by hedging but ended up 
creating foreign currency term-mismatches by borrowing short and lending long (Gagnon 2014).  
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The quantitative analysis of these imbalances is complicated by a number of factors 
which were at times misunderstood or misconstrued once the crisis was in train. Roughly half of 
the short-term foreign currency debt was incurred by local branches of foreign banks; short-term 
indebtedness by Korean banks and corporate borrowers was only about half of the headline 
number (Lee and Rhee 2012). If they have access to the central bank discount window of the 
currency in which they are borrowing then it should not be much of an issue. Another $39 billion 
of the borrowing and hedging were associated with the shipbuilding industry which is 
characterized by long lead times in production which generate dollar revenue streams once the 
ships are placed into operation.  
Nevertheless, once the crisis got started, Korea experienced an extraordinary “sudden 
stop” of capital inflows largely due to a collapse in bank loan roll-over rates, equivalent to -11.8 
percent of GDP between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. As illustrated in 
figure 5, the magnitude of this shock was larger than what Korea experienced during the 1997-98 
crisis. The won-dollar exchange rate plunged from 1030.1 at the end of May 2008 to 1467.8 on 
28 October, a 42.5 percent depreciation (Figure 6). Credit default spreads widened from 91 bps 
in early August to 675 bps on 27 October (Lee and Rhee 2012). The capital account deficit 
reached $43 billion or more than 20 percent of GDP. In Asia, only Malaysia experienced a 
bigger fall in capital inflows, and in the Malaysian case this was partly due to capital flight by 
domestic residents (Jeanne 2014 Table 3).  
Korea is a highly open economy with a trade share in excess of 100 percent of GDP. The 
year-on-year growth rate of Korean exports went from 27 percent in the third quarter of 2008 to -
9.9 percent in the fourth quarter, to -24.9 percent in the first quarter of 2009 and the stockmarket 
fell by nearly 30 percent (figures 7 and 8, respectively), on the same order of magnitude as 
during the 1997-98 crisis.  Some of this income and export slowdown would have occurred 
simply due to the contraction in world trade, so cannot be interpreted as a pure indication of the 
Korean crisis, nevertheless it certainly informed the authorities’ and public’s reaction to the 
crisis. 
While Korea had accumulated substantial reserves in the aftermath of the 1997-98 crisis 
as a method of self-insurance, the government eschewed activating the Chiang Mai Initiative 
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Multilateralization agreement, and confidence was not restored until the country concluded a $30 
billion swap agreement with the Fed.  
Once the immediate crisis period passed, the government began expanding 
macroprudential measures. Among these the government imposed restrictions on forward 
derivatives trading in excess of real transactions starting 1 January 2010; increase the ratio of 
mid- to long-term loan financing to mid- to long-term lending on foreign loan portfolios to 100 
percent; set ceilings on banks’ foreign exchange derivative contracts relative to bank capital; 
blocked a range of financial institutions from investing in foreign-currency bonds issued “for 
purposes of overseas use;” and imposed a stability level on noncore foreign exchange liabilities 
of banks.
10
  
These moves signaled that the Korean authorities were aware of the mismatch issue and 
was trying to address it. Nevertheless, Korean corporates continued to rely heavily on short-term 
debt (Gagnon 2014 Table 8) and during the May 2013 taper tantrum when it experienced the 
largest exchange rate depreciation of any emerging market (Glick 2015).    
This perceived vulnerability has conditioned the response of Korean authorities since. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) coined the term “fear of floating” to describe currency market 
interventions by authorities afraid that the exchange rate was moving too far too fast.  The 
received wisdom is that the 1997-98 Asian crisis was due in part to authorities trying to maintain 
pegged or quasi-pegged exchange rates for too long.  
Recent research suggests a growing comfort with floating by Asian central banks. Brooks 
(2015) calculates an index of exchange market pressure and then analyzes the extent to which 
central banks have permitted this pressure to be passed through to actual exchange rate changes, 
examining the pre-QE, pre-taper QE, and post-taper periods.  In general he finds a dwindling 
aversion to floating but with a few countries—India, Taiwan, and Korea lagging. In the case of 
Korea, Brooks estimates that fear of floating has grown in each successive period. 
He then disaggregates episodes of appreciation and depreciation. The results are striking: 
both Korea and Taiwan exhibit a strong asymmetry, permitting much more pass-through during 
                                                 
10
 However, as observed by the US Treasury, in June 2015, “Korea announced a series of 
steps to facilitate capital outflows, which would reduce underlying pressure for won appreciation 
stemming from its current account surplus” (US Treasury 2015 page 23). 
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periods of depreciation pressure relative to periods of market pressure to appreciate. Using a 
somewhat cruder model, Pontines and Siregar (2010) also obtain the result that Korea 
asymmetrically fears appreciation, and find that the degree of aversion to appreciation is the 
same whether they use the US dollar or the Chinese RMB as the reference currency.  Perhaps it 
is not coincidental that Korea and Taiwan are highly integrated with China, and as noted earlier, 
appear to be quite sensitive to movements in the value of the Chinese RMB. Indeed, 
Subramanian and Kessler (2013) find that the Korean won and Taiwanese dollar more closely 
track the Chinese RMB than the US dollar. 
This pattern has not gone unnoticed. Under Section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, the US Treasury is required to submit to the Congress semiannual 
reports addressing “whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency 
and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustment 
or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade” (US Treasury 2015 page 2).  This 
language parallels language in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement. In 
February 2013, the G-20 membership (including the United States, China, Japan, and Korea) 
committed to refraining from competitive devaluation and not targeting exchange rates for 
competitive purposes. This commitment was most recently reaffirmed in September 2015 by the 
G20 finance ministers and central bank governors.  
Korea figures prominently in the most recent Treasury report (October 2015) though 
neither it nor any other country is identified as a currency manipulator. The Treasury bill of 
particulars has five components: maintenance of a large current account surplus; an undervalued 
currency; intervention in the currency market to limit appreciation; the existence of fiscal space 
to address some of the underlying issues (though Treasury officials will admit that one’s 
assessment of how much fiscal space exists is contingent on how much is effectively set aside to 
deal with North Korea contingencies); and lack of transparency about intervention.  Treasury 
argues based on its own analysis and that of the IMF, that the won is undervalued, and that 
through the first half of 2015, the Bank of Korea has intervened to limit the won’s appreciation. 
However, and this is critical for Treasury’s bottom line, it recognizes that the last large 
interventions (July-August 2015) were to support the won (i.e. on the “right” side of the market 
from Treasury’s perspective).  Treasury concludes that “Given its undervalued currency, Korea 
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should not intervene in the foreign exchange market to limit the won’s appreciation should 
market pressure for appreciation return, and limit its intervention in the foreign exchange market 
to the exceptional circumstance of disorderly market conditions” (US Treasury 2015 page 24). 
Others are less circumspect. Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) establish four criteria for 
determining if a country is an exchange rate manipulator: “(1) Their foreign exchange reserves at 
year-end 2011 exceeded six months of goods and services imports…; (2) Their foreign exchange 
reserves grew faster than their GDP between 2001 and 2011; (3) Their current account was in 
surplus on average (as a share of GDP) between 2001 and 2011;  and (4) They had gross national 
income per capita in 2010 of at least $3,000, which is roughly the median of 215 countries 
covered by the World Bank’s Atlas method rankings” (Bergsten and Gagnon 2012 page 5). 
Korea, along with ten other countries (excluding oil exporters, but including China and Japan) 
made the list.
11
  
Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) suggest several policies to address what they regard as a 
significant macroeconomic issue affecting the United States. As a precursor, the US should try to 
obtain voluntary commitments to refrain from currency intervention. They observe that 
emphasizing the joint or coordinated nature of such a commitment insofar as a number of the 
countries that they identify as currency manipulators (including Korea) manage their floats vis 
the RMB, and they face common concerns about loss competitiveness if they appreciate and 
their rivals do not. However, if the US is unable to obtain voluntary commitments to abstain 
from intervening to limit appreciation, should select from a menu of four new policies: “First, it 
will undertake countervailing currency intervention (CCI) against countries with convertible 
currencies by buying amounts of their currencies equal to the amounts of dollars they are buying 
themselves, to neutralize the impact on exchange rates. Second, it will tax the earnings on, or 
restrict further purchases of, dollar assets acquired by intervening countries with inconvertible 
currencies (where CCI could therefore not be fully effective) to penalize them for building up 
these positions. Third, it will hereafter treat manipulated exchange rates as export subsidies for 
                                                 
11
 Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) recognize that for national security reasons Korea might 
want to hold reserves in excess of what might be deemed necessary on strictly economic 
grounds. The Bennet-Hatch-Carper amendment, discussed below, includes a national security 
waiver which could be relevant in the Korean case. 
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purposes of levying countervailing import duties. Fourth, hopefully with a number of other 
adversely affected countries, it will bring a case against the manipulators in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that would authorize more wide-ranging trade retaliation” (Bergsten and 
Gagnon 2012 page 1). 
The growing restiveness of the US Congress, reminiscent of the atmosphere of the late 
1980s which gave rise to Section 3004 in the first place, over these concerns surfaced 
dramatically during 2015 Congressional debates over the authorization of trade promotion 
authority (TPA) which was linked to the imminent conclusion of negotiations over the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Unprecedented legislation was proposed directly 
conditioning trade policy on currency concerns.
12
 In the end, the TPP agreement commits all 
TPP countries “to avoid unfair currency practices and refrain from competitive devaluation. TPP 
countries will publicly report their foreign-exchange intervention and foreign reserves data,” 
some for the first time. “Officials from all TPP countries will consult regularly to address 
macroeconomic issues, including to engage on efforts to avoid unfair currency practices.” The 
declaration confirms the TPP countries “will avoid manipulating exchange rates to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage over other Parties.” Commits those countries “to take policy actions to 
foster an exchange rate system that reflects underlying economic fundamentals and to avoid 
persistent exchange rate misalignments” and “to refrain from competitive devaluation and 
targeting exchange rates for competitive purposes” (Joint Declaration 2015). Were Korea to join 
TPP, the currency market intervention reporting would go beyond current practice, but it would 
not seem to be too heavy a lift. 
While some of the currency proposals failed in the Congress, the eventual compromise 
which permitted the passage of the TPA legislation has opened the door for the Bennet-Hatch-
Carper amendment to the Customs and Enforcement Bill which was passed in parallel with 
TPA.
13
 The Bennet-Hatch-Carper amendment has three components: a definition of currency 
                                                 
12
 This discussion of US politics draws on Bergsten (2015).  See that source for additional 
detail.  
13
 The proposed Portman-Stabenow amendment, which would have required “enforceable 
disciplines” on “negotiating objectives” in the TPP itself failed narrowly in the Senate.  It is 
worth noting that Sen. Rob Portman (R-Oh) is a former US Trade Representative. The Schumer-
Graham amendment which authorizes the imposition of countervailing duties against exports of 
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manipulation, a protocol for “enhanced engagement” (i.e. consultation) with trade partners 
deemed currency manipulators, and a menu of remedies if consultation fails.  
On the first issue, the amendment requires Treasury as part of its existing semiannual 
exchange rate reports to conduct “enhanced analysis” of major trade partners that have “a 
significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States… a material current account surplus 
and… engaged in persistent one-sided intervention in the foreign exchange market.” It then 
mandates that “the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury shall convene enhanced 
bilateral engagement with each country for which an enhanced analysis … is included in the 
report…” If, after one year, the President determines that the situation has not been rectified, it 
specifies that the President “shall” take “one or more” specified actions. These include 
prohibiting “the Overseas Private Investment Corporation from approving any new financing;” 
excluding that country from government procurement; instructing the US Executive Director at 
the IMF to advocate for enhanced surveillance of that country;  and lastly, instruct the USTR “to 
take into account” “in assessing whether to enter into a bilateral or regional trade agreement” 
with that country, “the extent to which that country has failed to adopt appropriate policies to 
correct” currency undervaluation and trade imbalances.  
These provisions have implications for Northeast Asia, possibly Korea in particular.
14
 
While China has been the centerpiece of concern in the run-up to the Congressional debate, its 
own adjustment, followed by market turbulence, a slowing of growth, and interventional to offset 
depreciation, means that the country is unlikely to be cited as a currency manipulator soon.  And 
while Japan’s QE policy has contributed to a depreciation of the yen, from the American 
perspective this is a “market-driven” exchange rate movement, not one generated by intervention 
in the currency market per se.  So Japan is also unlikely to be cited as a currency manipulator. 
                                                                                                                                                             
currency manipulators passed in the Senate but is strongly opposed by the House Republican 
leadership and is expected to be dropped in conference. 
14
 As Bergsten (2015) observes, the US auto assemblers were the prime political driver 
behind these legislative proposals, driven by competitiveness concerns primarily vis-a-vis 
Japanese producers, but Korean assemblers as well. The Ford Motor Company was particularly 
active in this regard.  It is worth recalling that Ford was twice blocked in its attempt to purchase 
Kia during that company’s denationalization (Noland 2000), and was a vocal opponent of the 
KORUS free trade agreement.   
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Korea is a different matter, however. At times it has run huge current account surpluses, 
which in a world of inadequate aggregate demand can be seen as shifting output and jobs from 
deficit countries. In principle, the objectives of the US and Korean governments are aligned: 
President Park has made reducing reliance on external demand and shifting the economy toward 
domestic demand a primary goal of her economic policy. Both the US and Korean governments 
would like to see Korean surpluses come down in an orderly fashion. Korea has implemented 
fiscal stimulus.  But Korean households are heavily indebted and consumption has not been very 
responsive to the stimulus.  
Moreover, Korea was named a currency manipulator in the first Treasury report in 1988 
and is once again in the crosshairs. Indeed, if Treasury comes under pressure to “do something” 
to forestall more rash initiatives in the Congress, Korea and Taiwan are likely to be at the top of 
the list. In this regard, the Treasury recognition that the last major Korean interventions in the 
market (July-August 2015) were to support the won, is likely to forestall imminent action. At this 
point, Treasury’s main focus is to improve transparency and discuss the use of fiscal space. 
Further out on the horizon, if as expected, the Bennet-Hatch-Carper amendment becomes law, it 
could undercut Korea’s efforts to attract direct investment from the US and interfere with 
Korea’s ability to join TPP as part of the next round of entrants (Schott 2015).15 
Some commentators (e.g. Bergsten-Gagnon 2012, Bergsten 2015, and implicitly, US 
Treasury 2015) have drawn a normative distinction between the exchange rate movements that 
occur as a byproduct of QE and those produced by direct interventions in the currency markets.  
From a Korean perspective, this may well be a distinction without a difference: larger, richer 
countries adopt UMP in response to self-inflicted wounds, but when smaller, poorer, more open 
countries move to dampen the exchange rate implications of the spillover, under legislation 
currently contemplated by the US Congress, they are threatened with exclusion from government 
procurement markets and preferential trade deals.  
                                                 
15
 With regard to government procurement, the legislation includes a provision that 
exempts signatories to the Government Procurement Agreement, of which Korea is one, from the 
exclusion from government procurement remedy.  This remedy could still apply to China, 
however. 
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As indicated previously, the US and Korean governments have a shared goal in seeing 
Korea’s reliance on external surpluses attenuate. One would hope that there is scope for 
cooperation. But this occurs against a backdrop in which many in the US regard surplus 
countries of stealing output and jobs, while many in Korea see the country as victimized by 
crises which have their origins in larger, richer countries. 
Under these circumstances, the resistance of Asian countries to the inclusion of exchange 
rate provisions in trade agreements is understandable, and, if the perspective embodied in the 
Bergsten-Gagnon-Treasury line were to prevail, laudable.  Nevertheless, the issue is not going 
away, and from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest, it behooves Korea to come to some 
kind of accommodation with the US on the issue. More open and frank consultations than have 
transpired thus far on transparency and the nature of Korean monetary policy and fiscal space 
and a realistic appraisal of North Korean contingencies would be the place to begin. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Global Financial Crisis has its origins in the United States and Europe. Unsteady 
implementation of fiscal policy responses forced an overreliance on monetary policy. The world 
has now entered unchartered territory in the aftermath of the crisis. The Fed and several other 
major central banks around the world have adopted unconventional monetary policies, and in the 
case of the Fed, appear to be at the cusp of exiting UMP and re-entering a world of positive 
interest rates.  Liftoff by the Bank of Japan appears less imminent, though hopefully will occur 
eventually under benign circumstances.  
That process of liftoff is likely to be accompanied by spillovers which will be felt in 
Northeast Asia due to trade and financial linkages with the US.  The specifics of how this all 
plays out are partly a function of scenario (a robustly growing US is the most optimistic 
situation) and conditions elsewhere. Exit from QE under robust growth conditions may be 
accompanied by financial market turbulence, but in the end should confer positive spillovers on 
Northeast Asia.  
Korea presents an interesting case because it is relatively small and relatively open and 
integrated in both trade and financial terms with both the United States and Japan. It appears that 
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the Bank of Korea targets the exchange rate with the RMB and intervenes to dampen 
appreciation. (This paper has focused on unconventional monetary policy, but developments in 
represent China an independent but related source of uncertainty.) Although Korean exchange 
rate intervention may reflect underlying concerns over competitiveness vis-a-vis China and 
similarly situated third countries like Taiwan, not the United States, this behavior has landed 
Korea front and center in US political debates over currency manipulation. There is no better 
evidence of the importance of this issue than the fact that President Barack Obama raised the 
currency issue with President Park Geun-hye at their meeting in October 2015.   
Despite the country’s current account surpluses, Koreans tend to see themselves as 
victims of a crisis that has its origins in policy mistakes and questionable if not criminal behavior 
in larger, richer countries. A successful US exit from QE is likely to contribute to dollar 
appreciation vis-à-vis the won, and a widening of the bilateral merchandise trade deficit. While 
these would be predictable outcomes of a successful macroeconomic adjustment, ironically they 
may also contribute to political frictions and complicate the implementation of trade policy. 
While one can question the justness of this emerging American view, from a standpoint of 
enlightened self-interest it would be advisable for Korea to reach some accommodation with the 
US on this issue. As part of this process of engagement, the US government needs to recognize 
explicitly that in its northern neighbor South Korea faces the world largest contingent liability, a 
situation that justifies the accumulation of larger reserves than would be justified on 
conventional economic grounds alone. Likewise Korea should be prepared for a more serious 
engagement between the two governments than has occurred to date on transparency and the 
nature of Korean monetary and fiscal policies.  
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Figure 4 
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